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Storing, processing, and transmitting data in cy-berspace always assumes risk: there’s no such thing as perfect security. However, one would think that enormous security breaches—of 
which Sony experienced two in a four-year period—would 
decline in frequency as awareness of the risk factors in-
creases, engineering knowledge and best practices be-
come more sophisticated, and commercial security prod-
ucts and services mature. But this isn’t the case.
In addition to cyberattacks, we’ve witnessed the dis-
covery of exploitable design flaws in widely used tools, 
such as the Unix Bash shell’s long-overlooked Shell-
shock vulnerabilities. Such vulnerabilities shouldn’t 
be surprising. In his Turing Award acceptance speech, 
“Reflections on Trusting Trust,” programming pioneer 
and Unix creator Ken Thompson stated that “you can’t 
trust code that you did not totally create yourself,” and 
demonstrated the difficulty of detecting whether a C 
compiler contains a Trojan horse. 
Bootstrapping trust is hard.1
INEVITABLE RISKS 
Given trusted computing’s un-
impressive track record, why do 
people continue to risk relying on 
computers for tasks from the mun-
dane, such as controlling home appliances remotely via 
the Internet, to those that are safety- or mission-critical, 
such as embedded control systems in automobiles or pas-
senger aircraft? In most cases, the user doesn’t have a 
choice, as computing has become ubiquitous. Moreover, 
users find uses for systems, applications, or services that 
developers hadn’t envisioned and expect some modicum 
of trust even though the trust ramifications haven’t yet 
been explored. 
For instance, constant Internet connection via a mobile 
device is seen as indispensable in order to compete in the 
business world. However, users typically treat these de-
vices as black boxes, not knowing how or whether data is 
being securely stored, processed, and transmitted. Users 
who experience a security issue or are hacked will likely 
want to switch to a different make, model, or service pro-
vider with a more trustworthy reputation, but such an op-
portunity doesn’t always exist.
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Recent high-profile cyberattacks such as the 
massive data leak at Sony leave us wondering 
where such lack of trustworthiness will take us. 
The answer, of course, is nowhere we want to go.
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Similarly, system integrators 
rely on reusing software and hard-
ware components to create prod-
ucts and services in a timely, cost- 
effective manner. However, unlike 
the typical user, system integrators 
and other developers usually have 
some control over the components 
they use—for instance, reusing 
open source software such as Open-
Stack Networking to create custom 
cloud-based services (www.open 
s t a c k . o r g / s o f t w a r e / o p e n s t a c k 
-networking). Even with visibility 
into the inner workings of OpenStack, 
though, developers still place some 
degree of trust in the decisions made 
by the contributors to the OpenStack 
project regarding architecture, de-
sign, implementation, and assurance.
In instances like these, users weigh 
the available evidence to determine 
whether the devices, systems, applica-
tions, or services they use—or might 
use—meet their trust requirements. 
If the evidence doesn’t support their 




So why is achieving trust in systems, 
applications, and services still an elu-
sive goal? Verifiably trusted systems 
have been built, and some success 
stories revolve around systems that 
could be well bounded and for which 
there was a compelling reason—such 
as national security—to spend the re-
sources necessary to achieve a high 
level of trust.
Creating trusted computing sys-
tems has a long history with many 
lessons learned. For instance, in the 
early 1970s the US Air Force con-
ducted a vulnerability analysis when 
evaluating the trustworthiness of the 
Multiplexed Information and Com-
puting Service (Multics) operating 
system.2 A decade later, the US De-
partment of Defense (DoD) published 
DoD 5200.28-STD, Trusted Computer 
System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC). 
TCSEC provided formal guidance on 
how to evaluate and assign trust lev-
els to products and systems. Today, 
the Common Criteria for Informa-
tion Technology Security Evaluation 
is used as a guide (www.common 
criteriaportal.org).
However, these documents, along 
with guidance provided by organiza-
tions such as the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology on archi-
tecting, designing, and implementing 
secure systems, aren’t always utilized. 
It’s common for stakeholders not to 
know the security policies for a sys-
tem, application, or service. Even when 
they do know the underlying require-
ments, how can they determine how 
much trust to place in a system, appli-
cation, or service without conducting a 
full evaluation? 
Developers and users found out the 
hard way when working with the Java 
virtual machine (JVM): security vul-
nerabilities keep being discovered, 
indicating a problem with the JVM 
security policy, the formal model of 
that policy, or that model’s imple-
mentation, such as the flaws found 
by Alessandro Coglio and Allen Gold-
berg.3 More than a decade later, Brian 
Krebs reported that “at least four of the 
37 security holes plugged in this re-
lease [of the Java SE platform] earned 
a Common Vulnerability Scoring 
System (CVSS) rating of 10.0—the 
most severe possible.”4
In addition to guidance on how 
to evaluate trustworthiness, many 
efforts have been made to develop 
trusted components for computing 
systems. For example, in 2001 the 
Trusted Computing Platform Alli-
ance (TCPA) released the specifica-
tion of the Trusted Platform Module 
(TPM), which allows users to address 
security requirements related to pro-
tecting against well-known attack 
vectors such as those associated with 
boot loading. But there was pushback 
against adopting the original TCPA 
specification. Some people viewed it 
as “weakening fair use doctrine, en-
couraging anticompetitive behavior, 
or eliminating privacy.”5 
Today, TPM security devices are 
available for securing computers, but 
these armor-plating mechanisms ar-
en’t used as commonly as one would 
expect, even on computers preloaded 
with TPM such that it only needs en-
abling. Some products resulting from 
similar research and development, 
such as the user-configurable IBM 
4758 secure coprocessor,6 have been 
adopted but not widely. 
Thus, there are perils involved in 
navigating the supply chain. With 
regard to the hardware life cycle, 
Mohammad Tehranipoor and his 
colleagues pointed out that “design-
ers must verify the trustworthiness 
of IP [intellectual property] cores as 
well as thoroughly test fabricated 
ICs [integrated circuits] to ensure 
that they perform as intended. In 
addition, because SoC [system on a 
chip] design-flow activities can oc-
cur at different geographic sites, the 
lack of centralized control makes it 
extremely difficult to ensure their 
 trustworthiness—design strategies 
should accordingly take trust into 
account.”7 Even protecting IP re-
mains a cat-and-mouse game, with 
an endless cycle of introducing anti–
reverse engineering techniques and 
demonstrating how those techniques 
can be defeated.8
We need to make substantial progress in the 
near term, but there’s no time like the present 
to start investigating trusted computing from the 
Internet of Anything’s vantage point.
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ADDITIONAL CHALLENGES
We also need to start thinking about 
the security challenges associated 
with the Internet of Anything (IoA), 
which includes anything that can be 
imagined as part of a networked or 
connected ecosystem,9 and the Sin-
gularity, a predicted future where 
humans will be able to transcend our 
biological limitations.10 Irena Bo-
janova, George Hurlburt, and Jeffrey 
Voas posed the question, “Can, and if 
so, to what extent, does an IoA need 
to be bounded for it to be possible 
to make it trusted?”9 One approach 
might be to throw out the traditional 
idea of bounding a system and in-
stead try to identify reusable core sets 
of emergent trust requirements that 
map to anticipated patterns of IoA 
entity behaviors, including patterns 
that require interaction and those 
that embody some notion of full or 
partial noninterference.
As part of the bootstrapping pro-
cess, what would it mean for a thing 
to be transparent enough to present 
the right level and amount of support-
ing evidence of trustworthiness to 
another entity or group of entities—
human or machine—within the IoA? 
Can it be done in time to support, for 
instance, proxemic sensing systems?
According to Sebastian Boring 
and his colleagues, trust for proxemic 
sensing systems should be based on 
meeting “users’ expectations about 
privacy and coerciveness.”11 Given 
that the trust modeling needs to ac-
count for one party trying to take 
advantage of another by leveraging 
trust mechanisms that should be pro-
tecting both parties, it would be in-
teresting to determine how the “dark 
patterns” (ways in which the opera-
tors of the proxemic sensing systems 
could take advantage of users) iden-
tified by Boring and his colleagues 
could be used for evaluating these 
sensing systems’ trustworthiness.
Luke Hohmann pointed out that 
“the level of trust is not a property of 
a method or a process, but a relation-
ship you have with the method or 
process.”12 If developing trusted sys-
tems, especially in the IoA, is truly 
a collaborative trust-making pro-
cess, how does one provide for such 
a method or process in a distributed 
environment in which the develop-
ers have extensive autonomy? Devel-
oping this relationship will involve 
experimentation to determine which 
methods or processes work well. These 
methods or processes may be quite dif-
ferent from those we are accustomed 
to, given that the computing paradigm 
for the proposed IoA is different from 
the paradigms of the past.
This article only scratches the surface in identifying hurdles we need to overcome to achieve 
the goal of trusted computing. We 
need to make substantial progress 
in the near term, but there’s no time 
like the present to start investigating 
trusted computing from the IoA’s van-
tage point. If we believe the prediction 
that the Singularity will occur around 
the year 2040, considerable work re-
mains to prepare for trustworthy 
 superintelligence, with a truly secure 
IoA serving as a stepping stone. 
DISCLAIMER
The views and conclusions contained 
herein are those of the author and should 
not be interpreted as necessarily repre-
senting the official policies or endorse-
ments of the US government.
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